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REMOVING THE CLOAK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
FROM CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS: PENDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATIONWIDE
SERVICE OF PROCESS
To believe that a defendant's contacts with the forum state should
be stronger under the due process clause for jurisdictional purposes
than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more concerned
with where he will be hanged than whether. *
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court shaped the contours of the modern pendent
jurisdiction doctrine in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. The Court
held that when a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a
substantial federal claim,2 it has the discretionary 3 power 4 to adjudi-
cate state law claims arising out of "a common nucleus of operative
* Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 88
(1978).
1. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The Court expanded the "unnecessarily grudging"
approach to pendent jurisdiction set forth in Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
383 U.S. at 725. In Hurn, the Court held that a federal court had power to hear the
entire case only when federal and state claims were "in support of a single cause of
action." 289 U.S. at 246.
2. 383 U.S. at 725. The Supreme Court has consistently required a determina-
tion of substantiality before permitting the appending of a state claim. See Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 539 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970); Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946); California Water Serv. Co. v. City of Red-
ding, 304 U.S. 252, 254 (1938); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103,
105 (1933).
The plaintiff in Gibbs alleged that the defendant had conducted an illegal second-
ary boycott in violation of § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 187 (1976), and attempted to append a state claim of illegal civil conspiracy and
boycott. Id. at 720.
3. 383 U.S. at 726. The Court suggested that state claims should be dismissed if
state issues substantially predominate the entire case, unless the state claims are
closely tied to questions of federal policy. Id. at 726-27. The Court also suggested
that state claims should be dismissed if the federal claims are disposed of before trial.
Id. at 726. The Court later qualified this suggestion in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397, 404-05 (1970) (mooting of the federal claim would not necessarily require
dismissal). Cf. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605,
623-29 (1974) (discretion to dismiss" state claims if brought late in the proceeding).
4. 383 U.S. at 725. Justice Brennan reasoned that the constitutional power of
pendent jurisdiction derived from article III of the Constitution: "Pendent jurisdic-
tion, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim 'arising under
[the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority. . . . ' U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and the relation-
ship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire
action before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.' " Id. (footnote omit-
ted) (emphasis in original).
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fact." -' A number of federal statutes providing for nationwide service
of process for federal claims6 have established the federal question
5. 383 U.S. at 725. Although pendent jurisdiction justifies the exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction in federal courts for state-created rights, personal jurisdiction
requirements must be independently satisfied. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9
(1976); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed,
435 U.S. 982 (1978); Pearce v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 613, 614-15 (D. Kan.
1978); Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 319 F. Supp. 772, 777 (N.D. Ill.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1972); 3A J. Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice 18.07 [1.-3], at 18-52 to -59 (2d ed. 1982); C. Wright, Law of
Federal Courts § 19, at 73-75 (3d ed. 1976).
6. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (actions to confirm arbitration awards under the Federal
Arbitration Act); 12 U.S.C. § 195 (1976) (actions by banks to enjoin the Comptroller
of the Currency); 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (actions by the United States under the
Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) (actions against a corporation under the
antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976) (actions by the United States under the Clayton
Act); 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976) (actions to enforce Federal Trade Commission subpoe-
nas); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976) (actions under the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1976) (actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 15 U.S.C. § 79y
(1976) (actions under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-43 (1976) (actions under the Investment Company Act of 1940); 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-14 (1976) (actions under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e) (1976) (actions under the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (1976) (appeals of administrative orders under the All Writs Act); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1655 (1976) (actions to assert rights in property when the defendant cannot be
served within the state); 28 U.S.C. § 1692 (1976) (actions concerning land that lies in
more than one district); 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1976) (service of process against a corpora-
tion in a shareholder's derivative action); 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)
(actions under interstate commerce laws); 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1976) (actions under the
Federal Interpleader Act); 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1976) (actions by the United States on
bonds for public works and buildings); cf. 35 U.S.C. § 293 (1976) (service and notice
to nonresident patentees). See generally 2 J. Moore, supra note 5, 4.42[1], at 4-518
to -523 (discussing federal statutes that permit extra-territorial service).
Unless there are provisions to the contrary under a specific federal statute, the
scope of personal jurisdiction in the federal courts for federal question and diversity
claims is controlled by rule 4(e), which provides for service of process in accordance
with the "statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(e). To obtain personal jurisdiction, federal courts apply the long-arm
statutes and corresponding case law of the state in which the district court sits.
Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1187 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 156 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 982 (1981); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain St.
Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980);
Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864
(1978); Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour, Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393, 400 (D. Neb. 1976).
Federal statutes permitting nationwide service of process, together with specific
congressional authorization, allow federal courts to circumvent state personal juris-
diction requirements. Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1979);
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 417-18 (9th Cir. 1977);
Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974); Ninth Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Eastman Kodak
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subject matter foundation for appending state-law claims through
pendent jurisdiction.7 Federal courts disagree as to whether they may
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants for purposes
of the pendent state cause of action by applying the nationwide service
provisions of federal statutes to the state claim. A number of district
court decisions have rejected this application of pendent personal
jurisdiction,8 although the growing trend of authority holds that a
federal court may so extend the reach of its non-federal personal
jurisdiction."
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 374 (1927); Robertson v. Rail-
road Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S.
569, 603-04 (1878); Lowenfels, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Federal Securities Acts,
67 Colum. L. Rev. 474, 492 (1967); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7), (e) and (f) (service of
process outside the state in which the district court is located).
7. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1980); Oetiker
v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Penn Cent.
Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973).
8. Ratner v. Scientific Resources Corp., 53 F.R.D. 325, 328 (S.D. Fla. 1971),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 462 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1972); Scovill Mfg. Co. v.
Dateline Elec. Co., 319 F. Supp. 772, 777 (N.D. Ill. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
461 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1972); Olympic Capital Corp. v. Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646,
658-59 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 274 F. Supp. 974, 980
(D.N.J. 1967), afJ'd, 406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969);
Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267, 271 (D. Colo. 1965);
Huber v. Bissel, 39 F.R.D. 346, 350 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Trussell v. United Underwrit-
ers, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801, 804-05 (D. Colo. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Crist v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965); Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium
Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (D. Mass. 1964); Beckmann v. Ernst, [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,462, at 94,798-99 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,
1964); ILGWU v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Kappus v.
Western Hills Oil, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 123, 127 (E.D. Wis. 1959); Hawkins v. Lindsley,
[1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,863, at 92,738 (S.D.N.Y.
June 10, 1958), affd, 327 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1964); Lasch v. Antkies, 161 F. Supp.
851, 852-53 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Schwartz v. Bowman, 156 F. Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), appeal dismissed on other grounds sub nom. Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195
(2d Cir. 1959).
Commentary supporting this result includes: R. Cramton, D. Currie, H. Kay,
Conflict of Laws 931 (3d ed. 1981); Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 11 Vill. L. Rev. 56, 79-80 (1965); Lowenfels, supra note 6, at 492.
9. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1980); Interna-
tional Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 941 (1979); Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973); Travis v. Anthes
Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1973); McDaniel v. Compania Minera
Mar de Cortes, S.A., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Ariz. 1981); Belke v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 518 F. Supp. 602, 605 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Ninth Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 982-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 747 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Donner
v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
S-G See. Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1123 (D. Mass. 1978); Warren
v. Bokum Resources Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (D.N.M. 1977); Bertozzi v.
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Important choice of law implications arise from the grant of pen-
dent personal jurisdiction'0 in this context." The Supreme Court has
King Louie Int'l, 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1172 (D.R.I. 1976); United States Dental Inst.
v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 575-76 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Sohns
v. Dahl, 392 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (W.D. Va. 1975); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC
Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 196 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Getter v. R.G.
Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 566-68 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Behlke v. Metalmac-
canica Plast, S.P.A., 365 F. Supp. 272, 277 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Allen Organ Co. v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1122-23 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Emerson v.
Falcon Mfg., 333 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Puma v. Marriott, 294 F.
Supp. 1116, 1121 (D. Del. 1969); Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp.
1376, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451, 454-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Johnston v. U.S. Trust Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 91,656, at 95,423 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 1966); Kane v. Central Am.
Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Cooper v. North Jersey
Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 980-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Townsend Corp. of Am. v.
Davidson, 222 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.N.J. 1963).
Commentary supporting this result includes: 5 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 2974
(Supp. 1969); 2 J. Moore, supra note 5, 4.42[1], at 4-523 to -524; C. Wright, supra
note 5, § 9, at 24; id. § 19, at 77; 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1125, at 528 (1969); Mills, Pendent Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial
Service Under the Federal Securities Laws, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 423, 446 (1970); Note,
Ancillary Process and Venue in the Federal Courts, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1164, 1177-78
(1960); Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding Concept in Federal Court Juris-
diction, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 151, 160 & n.59 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Expanding
Concept]; Recent Developments, Extraterritorial Service Provisions of Federal Stat-
ute Held Inapplicable to Pendent Nonfederal Claim, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 762, 765
(1963); Recent Cases, Federal Courts-Jurisdiction: In General-Personal Jurisdic-
tion Acquired Under Nationwide Service Statute Does Not Confer Pendent Jurisdic-
tion of Nonstatutory Claims-Lasch t). Antkies (E.D. Pa. 1958), 72 Harv. L. Rev.
773, 775 (1959); Recent Cases, Civil Procedure-Extraterritorial Service Provisions
of Securities Act Held Inapplicable to Common-Law Action for Rescission Joined
with Securities Act Allegation, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 714, 719 (1959).
10. For purposes of this Note, the term pendent personal jurisdiction is used to
describe the grant of personal jurisdiction over a defendant for purposes of the
pended state claim by utilizing federal nationwide service provisions. Although
courts and commentators use the term pendent party jurisdiction or pendent personal
jurisdiction to describe attempts to add a new party to a suit using the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine, for purposes of this Note, the term pendent third party jurisdic-
tion will be used to describe the addition of parties by pendent jurisdiction. See
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 10 (1976); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693, 715 (1973).
11. Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (D. Mass.
1964); ILGWU v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Lasch v.
Antkies, 161 F. Supp. 851, 852-53 (E.D. Pa. 1958). Commentary discussing choice of
law issues in granting pendent personal jurisdiction include: ALI, Study of the
Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts § 1313(a), at 211-12 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as ALI Study of Jurisdiction]; R. Cramton, D. Currie, H. Kay,
supra note 8, at 931; D. Currie, Federal Courts 221-22 (3d ed. 1982); E. Scoles & P.
Hay, Conflict of Laws 124-25 (1982); R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of
Laws § 10.7E, at 588 (2d ed. 1980); Currie, The Federal Courts and the American
Law Institute, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 268, 283-84 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Currie I];
Expanding Concept, supra note 9, at 160 n.59.
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held that notwithstanding the federal basis of its subject matter juris-
diction over the pendent state claim, the Erie doctrine 2 requires a
court to apply substantive state law to the adjudication of that
claim, 13 including, under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufactur-
ing Co., the forum state's choice of law rules.' 4 Thus, when a federal
court decides to exercise jurisdiction over a pendent state claim that is
multistate in nature, it must also examine the question of what law
the forum state would apply to the merits of that case. In adhering to
the ErielKlaxon doctrine, however, those courts that accept pendent
personal jurisdiction for a state claim through federal statutory pro-
cess have failed to examine the relationship between personal jurisdic-
tion and choice of law.
If a court concludes that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant is proper under the aegis of the pendent jurisdiction doc-
trine, unresolved constitutional issues still arise in the context of the
law to be applied to the state-created right. The unsettled nature of
constitutional choice of law thresholds results in part from recent
judicial assumptions that when the due process analysis of personal
jurisdiction is completed, choice of law concerns become moot.'1 This
preclusive effect of personal jurisdiction has been noted in recent
articles calling attention to the need for specifications of the contacts
required before a state may apply its substantive law and choice of
law rules to a case." The need for a separate analysis of choice of law
is heightened by the inherent forum bias of modern choice of law.
theories. 17
12. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, Justice Brandeis set forth
the rule for federal adjudications of state claims: "Except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State." Id. at 78.
13. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); System Operations
v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977); Kristiansen v.
John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99, 108 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Briskin v.
Glickman, 267 F. Supp. 600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Mintz v. Allen, 254 F. Supp.
1012, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of
Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, 1043 n.142
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Evolution and Scope].
14. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503 (1941).
15. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980);
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 & n.27 (1958).
16. Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State
and Federal Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1315, 1317, 1331-32 (1981); Hay, The Interrela-
tionship of Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law in United States Conflicts Law, 28 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 161, 173-74 (1979); Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law,
78 Mich. L. Rev. 872, 872-73 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Martin I]; Reese, Legisla-
tive Jurisdiction, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1587, 1592 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reese If;
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 80 (1978).
But see Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440, 487
(1982) (minimal scrutiny of state choice of law decisions).
17. See infra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
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Major Supreme Court decisions defining personal jurisdiction re-
quirements, including those decisions favoring a preclusive effect of
personal jurisdiction on choice of law analysis, have measured the due
process requirements with policies of fairness, foreseeability and the
"principles of interstate federalism."' 8  Commentators have, how-
ever, criticized this emphasis on interstate federalism while suggesting
that federalist policies are better suited to choice of law analysis.' 9 A
recent opinion, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee,20 portends a "potentially substantial"'" shift in Supreme
Court analysis. The Court stated that the personal jurisdiction re-
quirement flows from the due process clause, and represents a restric-
tion on judicial power as a matter of individual liberty, not as a
matter of sovereignty and federalism concerns. 22
Pendent personal jurisdiction has an important application to the
interrelationship of choice of law and personal jurisdiction. When a
court grants pendent personal jurisdiction for a state claim by utilizing
a federal nationwide service of process provision, personal jurisdiction
is satisfied by policy considerations of judicial economy and conven-
ience. 23 The modern trend of pendent personal jurisdiction cases,
therefore, leaves the question of constitutional choice of law thresh-
olds for state claims uncovered by the usual cloak of personal jurisdic-
tion analysis.
18. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877), overruled,
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
19. Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A
Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 429, 441, 452-53 (1981); Redish, Due Process, Federal-
ism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1112,
1114 (1981); Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations On State-Court Jurisdiction: A
Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Proc-
ess Clauses (Part Two), 14 Creighton L. Rev. 735, 840 (1981); see Hazard, A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241, 265; Kurland, The
Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and The In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 569, 585 (1958); Posnak, A Uniform Approach to
Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30
Emory L.J. 729, 788-91 (1981).
20. 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982). The Court allowed the application of Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b) (2) (A), which provides for sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders,
to support a finding of personal jurisdiction.
21. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct.
2099, 2110 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
22. 102 S. Ct. at 2104 & n.10.
23. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson
v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555-56 (3d Cir. 1973); Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 747 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Warren v. Bokum
Resources Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (D.N.M. 1977); Bertozzi v. King Louie
Int'l, 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1172 (D.R.I. 1976); United States Dental Inst. v. American
Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 575-76 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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Under the prevailing jurisprudence, federal courts need to apply
the forum state's choice of law analysis to the pendent state claim
because constitutional thresholds for personal jurisdiction are consid-
ered stronger than those for choice of law. This Note suggests that
courts must inquire into choice of law contacts for pendent personal
jurisdiction, and that a shift in federalism analysis should elevate
choice of law considerations to a higher constitutional threshold than
personal jurisdiction requirements.
Part I of this Note discusses the constitutional and judicial contours
of pendent jurisdiction, explaining that judicial authority for pendent
personal jurisdiction is not statutorily derived but rather is based on
policies of judicial economy and convenience. Part II analyzes the
interrelationship between choice of law and personal jurisdiction and
examines the consequences of a shift in federalism concerns upon the
resolution of pendent personal jurisdiction questions. Part III discusses
the availability of federal choice of law determinations when courts
grant pendent personal jurisdiction.
This Note concludes that when federal courts grant pendent per-
sonal jurisdiction and bypass minimum contacts restrictions on the
exercise of personal jurisdiction, they must do so as responsible neutral
forums, constrained to overlook Klaxon and forced to develop federal
choice of law rules for the purpose of deciding the state-created
claims. The recent Supreme Court shift in federalism analysis should
provide the courts with a stronger framework to evaluate constitu-
tional choice of law thresholds.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CONTOURS OF THE PENDENT
JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Pendent Claims
Article III of the United States Constitution 24 establishes the bound-
aries of federal jurisdiction.25  Article III is not self-executing-it
confers upon Congress the power to define and condition the require-
ments for federal subject matter jurisdiction within the constitutional
limits of article 111.26 Under the limited grant of power, access to
24. The federal courts have jurisdiction to hear only a limited scope of cases or
controversies: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority ...... U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
25. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978); United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 303, 304 (1809); C. Wright, supra note 5, § 7, at 17.
26. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,
512-13 (1868). Federal courts can only adjudicate those cases or controversies over
which jurisdiction has been conferred by congressional action. Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 440, 448-49 (1850). The provision for the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, however, has been interpreted as self-executing. Kentucky v. Denni-
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federal courts is restricted to categories of claims approved by acts of
Congress.2 7 Because federal courts are not competent to adjudicate
claims that fall outside their specific statutory authorizations, plain-
tiffs who seek redress for injuries arising from state-created claims
must ordinarily pursue their remedies in the proper state forum.2 The
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,2 9 however, extends a federal court's
power to hear an otherwise non-justiciable state claim.
Pendent jurisdiction evolved from the relationship between the
judicial power of federal courts and the boundaries of article III
jurisdiction. 30 The principle that federal courts have the power to
decide both federal and state issues originated in Osborn v. Bank of
the United States.31 Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the article
III grant of federal jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States contemplates and authorizes the
judicial review of all questions presented by the case. 32 This doctrine
son, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 98 (1860); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420
(1793); see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-76 (1803). For an
extensive discussion of federal judicial power, see L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, ch. 3 (1978).
27. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); Cary v.
Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
Federal courts are granted jurisdiction over controversies involving questions aris-
ing under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), or for claims exceeding $10,000 between citizens of different
states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976); see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 448-49
(1850) (the jurisdiction of federal courts authorized by statute may be narrower than
the boundaries of article III).
28. State courts possess wide subject matter jurisdiction. Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts
except when Congress has provided that federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (claims under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934); 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976) (admiralty claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979) (bankruptcy claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976) (patent claims).
29. The term "pendent jurisdiction" was first used in Best & Co. v. Miller, 67 F.
Supp. 809, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 167 F.2d 374 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
818 (1948); see Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis
of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1263, 1268 n.30 (1975).
30. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 6 (1976). For an overview of the theoretical
and evolutionary problems of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, see P. Bator, P.
Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 921-26 (2d ed. 1973).
31. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Osborn did not involve a pendent state claim,
but did raise the issue of whether a federal court could decide questions of state law
in the context of a case arising under federal law. In Osborn, the Bank of the United
States sued in federal circuit court to enjoin the collection of an allegedly unconstitu-
tional state tax. Questions of state law were applicable to the liability of parties, the
levying of interest and the validity of injunctive relief. Id. at 835-46.
32. Id. at 822-23. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that "when a question to
which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an
ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts
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was expanded in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,33 to permit
federal courts to decide cases on state grounds without having to reach
a federal question. 34 In Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,35 the
Court sustained jurisdiction over a compulsory state counterclaim
arising from the same transaction as the federal suit. 36 Pendent juris-
diction entered its present stage of development in Hurn v. Oursler,37
when the Court extended the doctrine to situations in which adjudica-
tion of state issues is justified solely on grounds of procedural conven-
ience. The Court in Hum held that if a plaintiff presented a viable
federal claim 38 and a state claim that were "two distinct grounds in
support of a single cause of action," 39 the federal courts had power to
hear the entire case. 40
jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved
in it." Id. at 823. Chief Justice Marshall noted that "[t]here is scarcely any case, every
part of which depends" solely upon federal law. Id. at 820.
33. 213 U.S. 175 (1909). In Siler, a state order regulating railroad rates was
attacked under both state and federal law. Id. at 177-78.
34. Id. at 191. The Court held that when federal jurisdiction is based on a federal
question, courts have the "right to decide all the questions in the case, even though it
decided the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or even if it
omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local or state questions only."
Id. The Court recognized that this result was based upon the traditional policy of
avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions. Id. at 193; see Ashwander v. T.V.A.,
297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
35. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). In Moore, plaintiff claimed a federal violation of the
Sherman Act and defendant asserted a compulsory state counterclaim alleging the
theft of quotations from his cotton exchange. Id. at 602-03.
36. Id. at 609-10. The Court upheld jurisdiction although the federal claim had
been dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the state claim had no independent
federal jurisdictional basis. Id. at 609. Between Siler and Moore, the Supreme Court
continued to hold that the pendent doctrine was constitutionally sound and discre-
tionary with the courts. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 393-94 (1932); Chicago
Great W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 97-101 (1924); Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co.
v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 264 (1919); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban
R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 508 (1917); Louisville & Nash. R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298,
303-04 (1913).
37. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Hurn involved a federal claim of statutory copyright
infringement and state claims of unfair competition for the unauthorized use of a
dramatic production and unfair competition through the use of an uncopyrighted
version of the production. Id. at 239.
38. The Court required that the federal question averred must not be "plainly
wanting in substance." Id. at 246.
39. Id. The Hurn focus on a pendent jurisdiction test based on the concept of a
"cause of action" was criticized in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724-
25 (1966), as difficult to apply and "unnecessarily grudging." See supra note 1 and
accompanying text; Shulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Fed-
eral Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 393, 397-410 (1936).
40. 289 U.S. at 246. The Court stated its view of the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine by making the following comparison:
The distinction to be observed is between a case where two distinct grounds
in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of which presents
a federal question, and a case where two separate and distinct causes of
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The modern doctrine of pendent jurisdiction was formulated in
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, in which the Supreme Court declared
that once a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a sub-
stantial federal claim, it also has the power to decide a state-law claim
that arises out of a "common nucleus of operative fact" sufficiently
related to the federal claim so that a plaintiff would normally "be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding. ' 41  Writing for
the Court, Justice Brennan was careful to point out, however, that
pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion and not of right,4 2 and
that "[i]ts justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, con-
venience and fairness to the litigants; if these are not present a federal
court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims." 43
Although the Supreme Court failed to identify a congressional grant
of statutory authority to support this extension of subject matter juris-
diction in the federal courts, 44 the reasoning in Gibbs supplies a
constitutional underpinning for the doctrine. 45 Justice Brennan pos-
ited that when a federal and state claim are sufficiently related, they
may constitute a single "case" under article III and, therefore, a
federal court has the same constitutional power of subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate the state claim as it has to adjudicate the
federal claim. 46  Gibbs' endorsement of pendent jurisdiction as an
extension of subject matter jurisdiction serves desirable ends; the
avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and the promotion of judicial econ-
omy within the bounds of fairness to the litigants. Moreover, it cau-
action are alleged, one only of which is federal in character. In the former,
where the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the
federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may
nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the non-federal ground; in
the latter it may not do so upon the non-federal cause of action.
Id. (emphasis in original). The Hurn doctrine was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b)
(1976), which gave federal courts original jurisdiction of unfair competition claims
when pended with a substantial and related claim under the federal intellectual
property laws. See Note, The Doctrine of Hurn v. Oursler and the New Judicial
Code, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 406, 407 (1952).
41. 383 U.S. at 725. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
42. 383 U.S. at 726.
43. Id; see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) ("The value of efficiency in
the disposition of lawsuits by avoiding multiplicity may be readily conceded, but that
is not the only consideration a federal court should take into account in assessing the
presence or absence of jurisdiction." (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker
Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1972))).
44. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1976); see Currie, Pendent Parties,
45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 753, 754 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Currie II]; Theis, Pendent
Jurisdiction Over Claims Arising Under Federal Law, 32 Hastings L.J. 91, 94-95
(1980).
45. The standards for pendent jurisdiction announced in Gibbs satisfy the article
III test for federal jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S.
365, 371 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976); Ortiz v. United States,
595 F.2d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 1979); see Currie II, supra note 44, at 754.
46. 383 U.S. at 725.
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tions against the exercise of the doctrine beyond reasonable limits, and
against "[n]eedless decisions of state law .. .as a matter of comity
and . . . justice. 4
B. Pendent Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process
1. Pendent Personal Jurisdiction
The current trend of lower court authority has been to interpret the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine as sustaining the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over state claims when nationwide service on nonresident
defendants is supported only by specific statutory provisions applica-
ble to the federal claim. 48  These courts maintain that when the
defendant is validly before the court for the federal claim, his proce-
dural due process rights are not violated when the state claim is to be
confronted on the same factual issues. 49 Thus, the courts reason, the
defendant has had notice sufficient to avoid unfair surprise, and the
interests of judicial economy and convenience are served by avoiding
piecemeal litigation.50 The lower courts attempt to justify the grant
of pendent personal jurisdiction by inferring congressional authoriza-
tion from the language in federal statutes providing for nationwide
service of process. 5'
47. Id. at 726.
48. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1980); Belke v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 602, 605 (S.D. Fla. 1981);
United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 575
(N.D. Ill. 1975). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
49. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980); Robinson
v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973); Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United
States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 575 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); Allen Organ 'Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1122
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
50. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson
v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973); Ninth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gilbert v.
Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 747-48 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Warren v. Bokum Resources
Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (D.N.M. 1977); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l, 420 F.
Supp. 1166, 1172 (D.R.I. 1976); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of
Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 576 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
51. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (patents);
Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973) (securities); Travis v.
Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1973) (same); Ninth Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(same); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 746-47 (M.D.N.C. 1980) (same);
Donner v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 n.5 (E.D.
Pa. 1979) (copyright); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l, 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1171-72
(D.R.I. 1976) (securities); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodon-
tists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 575-76 (antitrust); Townsend Corp. of Am. v. Davidson, 222
F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.N.J. 1963) (investment companies); see Mills, supra note 9, at 439-
41 (securities).
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The courts that have refused to exercise pendent personal jurisdic-
tion have ruled that a federal court may not exert personal jurisdiction
for purposes of the state claim simply because the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction placed the entire litigation within that court's subject
matter jurisdiction. 52 These courts have maintained that the federal
statutes asserted as the basis for pendent jurisdiction do not provide
nationwide service for both federal and state claims, 53 and that im-
plied extensions of service of process are in violation of Supreme Court
precedent and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 4  The basic
contention against granting pendent personal jurisdiction is not that it
is procedurally unfair or burdensome to defend in a particular state,
but rather, that it is a violation of constitutional rights to apply state
choice of law rules to a case when the state court would be unable to
obtain personal jurisdiction. 55
52. See supra note 9.
53. Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 319 F. Supp. 772, 777 (N.D. Ill.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1972); Olympic Capital Corp.
v. Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646, 659 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Trussel v. United Underwrit-
ers, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. Colo. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Crist v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965); Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium
Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (D. Mass. 1964); see Ferguson, supra note 8, at 73-
74.
54. Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 274 F. Supp. 974, 980 (D.N.J. 1967), alf'd,
406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969); Huber v. Bissel, 39
F.R.D. 346, 350 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F.
Supp. 801, 804 (D. Colo. 1964), affd sub nom. Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965); Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp.
703, 705-06 (D. Mass. 1964). These cases refusing to exercise pendent personal
jurisdiction are in harmony with recent Supreme Court decisions discussing the
contours of pendent jurisdiction. Compare Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) ("[A] finding that federal and nonfederal claims arise from
a 'common nucleus of operative fact,' the test of Gibbs, does not end the inquiry into
whether a federal court has power to hear the nonfederal claims along with the
federal ones. Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an examination of
the posture in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute that
confers jurisdiction over the federal claim .... ) and Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1, 18 (1976) ("Before it can be concluded that [pendent third party] jurisdiction
exists, a federal court must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that
Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication
negated its existence.") with Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp.
703, 705 (D. Mass. 1964) ("While it clearly would be within the competence of
Congress in cases involving pendent claims to allow the process of the district court to
run into every part of the United States ... this must be done expressly, and such an
intent is not to be read into a statute by implication.").
55. Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (D. Mass.
1964) ("It seems extremely doubtful that in enacting the provisions for extra-territo-
rial service on claims arising out of violations of federal laws, Congress intended out-
of-state defendants to be subject to whatever the various peculiarities of distant state
law might be."); ILGWU v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
("[Congress] would normally hesitate to force [defendants'] appearance far from
home to defend against demands under laws the degree of severity or intricacy of
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The Supreme Court has historically guarded the limits of service of
process. In Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board,56 the Court rejected
an assertion of nationwide process 57 by stating that explicit extensions
of personal jurisdiction by Congress have been "clearly expressed and
carefully guarded exceptions to the general rule of jurisdiction in
personam."5 Rule 4(f) 59 allows service of process outside the territo-
rial limits of the state in which the district court sits when authorized
by federal statute.60 This authorization is the procedural link to the
grant of pendent personal jurisdiction. Courts that have rejected pen-
dent personal jurisdiction recognize that bootstrapping the applicable
federal service provision to the state claim is inconsistent with rule 4,
which is a procedural mechanism rather than a jurisdictional rule. 1
In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,62 the Supreme Court
recognized that rule 4 should be considered in procedural rather than
jurisdictional terms: Service of process "serves only to implement the
jurisdiction over the subject matter which Congress has conferred, by
providing a procedure by which the defendant may be brought into
court."6
3
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the question of implied
extensions of personal jurisdiction is one of statutory construction, 64
requiring careful scrutiny for evidence of congressional intent. 65 The
federal question statute 6  and other statutes6 7 provide the district
courts with subject matter jurisdiction over "actions." The word
"action" has been treated by courts granting pendent personal juris-
which were unknown to Congress."); see Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236
F. Supp. 801, 804-05 (D. Colo. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Crist v. United Underwriters,
Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965); Lasch v. Antkies, 161 F. Supp. 851, 852-53
(E.D. Pa. 1958).
56. 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
57. Id. at 627.
58. Id. at 624.
59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
60. Id.
61. Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 319 F. Supp. 772, 777 (N.D. Ill.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1972); Olympic Capital Corp.
v. Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646, 658-59 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Levin v. Great W. Sugar
Co., 274 F. Supp. 974, 980 (D.N.J. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969).
62. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
63. Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
64. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); see Frankfurter,
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 535 (1947).
65. 268 U.S. at 627.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
67. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976) (Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976)
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (Federal
antitrust laws).
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diction as equivalent to a "case" in constitutional terms.68  In giving
jurisdiction over an "action," Congress apparently has also granted
the district courts power to consider state-law claims meeting the
Gibbs test. What is not apparent is whether the nationwide service
provisions of these statutes apply to the state claims.
Courts invoking pendent personal jurisdiction have maintained that
when pendent jurisdiction is granted, the federal and state claims
comprise only one "case" within the meaning of article III, and
consequently, federal courts have "power" to hear the entire case.60
These courts then conclude that statutory language authorizes nation-
wide service over state claims, 70 a conclusion supported by consider-
ations of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." 7'
The majority of pendent personal jurisdiction cases involve the pend-
ing of state claims such as misrepresentation, fraud and blue sky
violations to the federal securities statutes.72 The major securities
statutes all have similar language, which provides that "process in
such cases may be served . . . wherever the defendant may be
found. ' 73 In the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
68. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1980); Ninth Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
69. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1980); Ninth Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp.
565, 575-76 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
70. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1980); Oetiker
v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Ninth Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
71. Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp.
981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
(1966)); see Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980); Gilbert
v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 748 (M.D.N.C. 1980).
72. The federal securities statutes that are most frequently involved in pendent
personal jurisdiction are the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976),
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). Courts
interpreting pendent personal jurisdiction under these statutes include: Hargrave v.
Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1980); International Controls Corp.
v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979);
Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973); McDaniel v. Compa-
nia Minera Mar de Cortes, S.A., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 152, 154-55 (D. Ariz. 1981); S-G
See., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1122-23 (D. Mass. 1978). Courts
that have not found statutory approval or implication for pendent personal jurisdic-
tion under these statutes include: Ratner v. Scientific Resources Corp., 53 F.R.D.
325, 328 (S.D. Fla. 1971), appeal dismissed per curiam, 462 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.
1972); Olympic Capital Corp. v. Newman, 276 F. Supp. 646, 658-59 (C.D. Cal.
1967); Levin v. Great W. Sugar Co., 274 F. Supp. 974, 980 (D.N.J. 1967), aff'd, 406
F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969); Parker v. Baltimore Paint &
Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 267, 271 (D. Colo. 1965).
73. Securities Act of 1933, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976) (emphasis added);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (emphasis added).
Similar provisions for nationwide service of process are found in: Public Utility
1982] PENDENT JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW 141
Act of 1934, the most common statutory bases for use of pendent
personal jurisdiction,7 4 the "such cases" is preceded by "all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this [chapter]. ' 75 The plain language of the statutes, the
initial inquiry in statutory construction, 76 directs nationwide process
only toward the federal claim with no mention of pendent personal
jurisdiction.
The courts that find statutory approval for pendent personal juris-
diction in the securities statutes uniformly cite the leading article
advocating pendent personal jurisdiction. 77 That article supports an
interpretation of pendent personal jurisdiction by claiming that the
federal courts' jurisdiction over the subject matter of pendent claims
would be destroyed if the statutes were not interpreted to allow
pendent personal jurisdiction. 7  This argument runs contrary to
Holding Company Act of 1935, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1976); Trust Indenture Act of
1939, § 322, 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, § 44, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 214, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14
(1976); see Mills, supra note 9, at 439 n.72.
74. Securities Act of 1933, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
75. Securities Act of 1933, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). The same order in the statutory language
appears in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1976),
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1976), and in the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976).
76. C. Sands, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973); see
Frankfurter, supra note 64, at 535 ("Though we may not end with the words in
construing a disputed statute, one certainly begins there.").
77. Mills, supra note 9, at 439-441.
78. Id. at 440 n.74. The relevant text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), is quoted to provide an understanding of the article's
interpretation: The district courts of the United States have jurisdiction of "all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder [sentence I] .... Any suit or action
to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules or regulations
thereunder [may be brought in the proper district] . . .and process in such cases
may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or
wherever the defendant may be found [sentence III]." Id. at 439.
Mills argues that negative implications support pendent personal jurisdiction:
The phrase "brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chap-
ter" that modifies the phrase "all suits in equity and actions at law" in the
first sentence of the statutes by implication also modifies the 'cases' for
which extraterritorial service is authorized in the last half of the third
sentence. It has been argued that this construction prevents a federal district
court from hearing a pendent claim against a defendant who was served
extraterritorially, i.e., that a case that includes a pendent claim is not a case
"brought to enforce any liability or duty created" by the statute; see Fergu-
son, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 11 Vill. L. Rev.
56, 73-74 (1965). This argument necessarily but tacitly assumes that the
modifying phrase should be construed as if it read "brought solely to enforce
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straightforward statutory language and more importantly, assumes
that pendent subject matter jurisdiction must also derive from the
statutes providing district courts with jurisdiction over securities
actions or other specific statutory grants of article III jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court has declared, however, that pendent subject matter
jurisdiction is a constitutional power under article III. 79 At the same
time the Court has avoided the jurisdictional question of whether
Congress has authorized such an exercise of judicial power. Commen-
tators have assumed that congressional authority for pendent subject
matter jurisdiction can only derive from the general federal question
statute.80  It is incorrect, therefore, to premise the grant of pendent
personal jurisdiction upon the statutory authorization of federal na-
tionwide service of process.
2. Pendent Third-Party Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has in recent decisions reinforced a restrictive
statutory interpretation of pendent personal jurisdiction. In Zahn v.
International Paper Co., "' four plaintiffs brought a class action for
any liability or duty created by this chapter." Of course, if it were construed
in this manner it would destroy the federal courts' jurisdiction over the
subject matter of pendent claims, because the statute's first sentence would
then be construed as meaning "The district courts of the United States
• . . shall have. . . jurisdiction of. . . all suits in equity and actions at
law brought solely to enforce any liability or duty created by this chap-
ter .... " This meaning has never been attributed to the first sentence of
the statute. But if the word "solely" cannot be added by implication to the
first sentence, it cannot be added by implication to the third sentence; the
use of the word "such" in the third sentence requires that that sentence's
"such cases" be co-extensive with the first sentence's "suits in equity and
actions at law." In short, if the federal securities statutes provide any
statutory basis for federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of pendent
claims, then they also provide a statutory basis for permitting the use of
extraterritorial service to assert those claims.
Id. at 440 n.74 (emphasis in original).
Even if this argument's contention that the "cases" in the third sentence is co-
extensive with the "actions" in the first sentence, the basic premise of the argument
rests upon the assertion that pendent subject matter jurisdiction must derive solely
from this statute for federal securities questions. Although the Supreme Court has
never specifically identified the statutory grant of pendent subject matter jurisdic-
tion, this authorization is uniformly recognized as coming from the general federal
question statute. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
79. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9 (1976); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
80. See Currie II, supra note 44, at 754; Scheinker, Ensuring Access to Federal
Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 245, 256-57
(1980); Theis, supra note 44, at 94-95. The federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."
81. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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pollution damages and based federal jurisdiction on diversity of citi-
zenship. The Supreme Court affirmed a refusal to hear any claims
that did not independently satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional require-
ment and rejected an attempt to append the insufficient claims to the
claim that exceeded the jurisdictional amount.8 2 Personal jurisdiction
and the $10,000 jurisdictional amount are both prerequisites for fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction. 3 Zahn establishes that plaintiffs failing to
meet the jurisdictional requirements are not part of the same action
for purposes of pendent jurisdiction.8 4 Similarly, this analysis sup-
ports the contention that the requirement of personal jurisdiction
must remain separate from subject matter jurisdiction and, conse-
quently, be satisfied independently.85
The Supreme Court has also examined the viability of pendent
third-party jurisdiction, a "subtle and complex question with far-
reaching implications." 88  In Aldinger v. Howard,17 the Court held
that before the Gibbs test is applied, federal courts must determine
both that jurisdiction is permitted under article 11188 and that Con-
gress has neither expressly nor impliedly negated the exercise of pen-
dent jurisdiction under federal statutes conferring subject matter juris-
diction. 9 The Court acknowledged that the Gibbs analysis provided
only the article III test for pendent jurisdiction and that courts must
82. Id. at 301. The Court held that "any plaintiff who does not [meet the
jurisdictional amount] must be dismissed from the case" even though others allege
jurisdictionally sufficient claims. Id.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976); see Loss v. Blakenship, 673 F.2d 942, 949 (7th
Cir. 1982); Johanning v. Johanning, 509 F. Supp. 770, 772 (D.N.J. 1981).
84. 414 U.S. at 292-95.
85. Cf. Currie II, supra note 44, at 757 (pendent third-party jurisdiction must be
independently satisfied).
86. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715 (1973); see Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 2 (1976); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 720 (1975). In
Mloor, the Court was faced with the viability of pendent third-party jurisdiction for
the first time. The plaintiff alleged violations of his federal civil rights against a state
officer based upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and attempted
to append the officer's municipal employer under a state-created theory of vicarious
liability, which was unavailable under federal law. 411 U.S. at 710-11. The Court
emphasized the "significant difference" in the facts of Gibbs, id. at 713, and held
that the district court's decision to decline to exert pendent jurisdiction was a legiti-
mate exercise of its discretion, id. at 716, thereby avoiding a ruling on the availability
of pendent third-party jurisdiction.
87. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
had refused the plaintiff's attempt to pend to the federal claim of civil rights viola-
tions under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)
a state claim against a county alleging vicarious liability. Aldinger v. Howard, 513
F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
88. 427 U.S. at 18.
89. Id.
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therefore inquire into the possible statutory limits on jurisdiction. 0
Because statutes dictate the boundaries of federal subject matter juris-
diction, a court must scrutinize whether the statute either specifically
excludes certain parties from suit or designates the parties amenable to
the court's power prior to granting pendent jurisdiction."' In the
most recent decision examining pendent jurisdiction, Owen Equip-
ment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,92 the Supreme Court restricted the
expansion of established pendent jurisdiction theory by re-emphasiz-
ing the statutory and procedural analysis set forth in Aldinger.9' The
90. Id. at 17. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. The Court defined the
inquiry into pendent third-party jurisdiction as follows: " [W]hether by virtue of the
statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction, upon which petitioner's principal
claim . . . rests, Congress has addressed itself to the party as to whom jurisdiction
pendent to the principal claim is sought." Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
91. The Court in Aldinger made clear that both article III constitutional power
and lack of congressional disinclination are prerequisites to the exercise of pendent
party jurisdiction. Id. at 18. The Court described a "congressional disinclination" to
extend pendent party jurisdiction over a political subdivision under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and merely suggested that "[olther statutory grants and other alignments of parties
and claims might call for a different result." Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added). The
Court suggested that the argument of judicial economy and convenience, the major
justification of pendent jurisdiction in Gibbs, may support extending pendent juris-
diction into areas in which there are exclusive grants of federal jurisdiction since it is
only in federal court that all claims may be tried together. Id. at 18.
92. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). In Kroger, the administratrix of an Iowa citizen brought
a diversity action for her husband's wrongful death against a Nebraska corporation.
The corporation impleaded an Iowa corporation for the right of contribution and the
Iowa plaintiff then amended her complaint to state a direct claim against the Iowa
corporation. All of the claims arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact, but
diversity was absent between the Iowa corporation and the Iowa plaintiff. The Court
held that federal diversity jurisdiction does not extend to include a plaintiff's asser-
tion of pendent jurisdiction over a non-diverse third-party defendant. The Court
implied that ancillary jurisdiction, the technical procedure attempted in Kroger,
should be evaluated in light of the congressional goal of efficient and fair dispositions
of related claims. Id. at 377. Ancillary jurisdiction refers to the addition of state
claims in the form of third-party claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims. See Feder-
man v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 810 (2d Cir. 1979); Pearce v.
United States, 450 F. Supp. 613, 615 (D. Kan. 1978); Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle
Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76, 79 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Minahan, Pendent and
Ancillary Jurisdiction of United States Federal District Courts, 10 Creighton L. Rev.
279, 293-97 (1976); Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction:
Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1935, 1936-37 (1982).
The Court in Kroger refused to determine whether there was a significant difference
between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. 437 U.S. at 370 n.8; accord Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
93. 437 U.S. at 373. The Court reiterated that two hurdles must be overcome as
prerequisites to the exercise of federal jurisdiction: Federal courts are limited by both
the outer boundaries of article III and the acts of Congress conferring article III
jurisdiction. Id. The Court required an inquiry into the posture in which the state
claim is asserted and an examination of the specific federal statute to determine
whether Congress had either expressly or implicitly negated the exercise of jurisdic-
tion. Id.
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Ninth Circuit has gone so far as to hold that pendent third-party
jurisdiction is unconstitutional under article III without having to
implicate a statutory analysis. 94 The court emphasized that the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction applies only to claims and not to par-
ties.95
Although pendent personal jurisdiction is theoretically wedged be-
tween pendent claim and pendent third-party jurisdiction, the recent
statutory limitations on pendent jurisdiction necessarily have an effect
on pendent personal jurisdiction. 96 One component of the subtlety
and complexity of pendent third-party jurisdiction involves choice of
law issues, and courts granting pendent third-party jurisdiction have
relied upon the recent trend in the area of pendent personal jurisdic-
tion to retain jurisdiction over the third parties.9 7  Lower federal
94. Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). The Ninth Circuit's restrictive interpretation of
pendent third-party jurisdiction has been consistently affirmed by the Supreme Court
despite widespread rejection in other circuit courts. E.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1, 3 (1976); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 714 n.30 (1973).
95. 550 F.2d at 1199-1200. In Ayala, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its absolute
ban against pendent third-party jurisdiction in any context. The federal claim in
Ayala was brought against the government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976), and a state claim was asserted against a third-party
defendant. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the grant of federal jurisdiction is
exclusive. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). The Ayala court followed Aldinger's directive
that an initial determination of pendent jurisdiction be made under article III before
inquiring into statutory authority. The Ninth Circuit has maintained consistently
that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction applies to claims and not parties. 550 F.2d at
1199-1200; Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427
U.S. 1 (1976); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1972), affd sub
noma. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d
136, 137 (9th Cir. 1969); accord Kack v. United States, 570 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir.
1978); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 917 (1974); Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797, 798-99 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S 964 (1965); Long Prairie Packing Co. v. Midwest Emery
Freight Sys., 429 F. Supp. 201, 203-04 (D. Mass. 1977). But see FDIC v. Otero, 598
F.2d 627, 632-33 (1st Cir. 1979); Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 72-73 (1st Cir.
1979); Transok Pipeline Co. v. Darks, 565 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 337
n.3 (D.N.J. 1979).
96. Scheinker, supra note 80, at 247 ("Pendent jurisdiction today stands at a
crossroads. Aldinger and Kroger'reflect clearly a restrictive view of pendent party
jurisdiction. Although these opinions did not question directly the exercise of pendent
claim jurisdiction under Gibbs, their reasoning threatens the continued vitality of
that branch of the doctrine as well. These decisions indicate that the generally
accepted rationale for pendent jurisdiction-judicial economy and convenience-is
inadequate not only to support the extension of Gibbs to pendent party jurisdiction,
but perhaps even to justify Gibbs itself." (footnote omitted)); Theis, supra note 44, at
104 ("Zahn, Aldinger, and Kroger all emphasize congressional intent as a limit on
pendent jurisdiction .... ").
97. See, e.g., Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 518 F. Supp.
602, 604-05 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559,
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courts also have held that the statutory limitations for pendent third-
party jurisdiction are applicable to general pendent claim jurisdiction,
and therefore, to pendent personal jurisdiction.9
It is evident that no explicit statutory authorization can be found
for pendent personal jurisdiction, and that implicit authorization is
precluded by both the clear meaning of the statutes and Supreme
Court restrictions on pendent jurisdiction. The decision to grant either
pendent personal or pendent third-party jurisdiction requires courts to
decide matters not specifically enumerated in any statutory grant of
federal jurisdiction. Ultimately, the question to be decided is whether
the policies behind pendent jurisdiction suggest that personal jurisdic-
tion for state claims should be applied by analogy through federal
nationwide service provisions even without explicit or implicit autho-
rization.
C. Pendent Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Resolution
If pendent personal jurisdiction is to be authorized, the policies for
its existence must derive from the congressional grant of general fed-
eral question jurisdiction over actions that arise under the laws of the
United States. 99 In that the Supreme Court has not specifically iden-
tified the congressional authorization, if any, for pendent subject
matter jurisdiction, this Note allows for a possible justification of
pendent personal jurisdiction in the general federal question clause. In
566-67 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 451, 455 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); C. Wright, supra note 5, § 20, at 77.
In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), the Court cited Redden v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Payne v. Mertens, 343 F.
Supp. 1355, 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Letmate v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 311 F. Supp.
1059, 1060-62 (D. Md. 1970); Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (E.D.N.Y.
1970), and other lower court refusals to exercise jurisdiction over pendent third
parties. 411 U.S. at 714 n.30. In Redden, the court raised concerns about differences
in state law if jurisdiction were to be granted. 347 F. Supp. at 1231.
98. United States ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 440 (7th Cir. 1982);
Jong-Yul Lim v. International Inst. of Metropolitan Detroit, 510 F. Supp. 722, 725
(E.D. Mich. 1981); Brame v. Ray Bills Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568, 595-96 (N.D.N.Y.
1979); Wesley v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 117, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
see Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 Colum. L. Rev.
127, 147-52 (1977); Comment, Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs
and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 Yale L.J. 627, 633-34 (1978). But see Gagliardi v.
Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 115 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1977) (statutory limitations inapplicable to
pendent claims), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978). An alternative analysis might
assume congressional intent to allow pendent claims, while employing a strict scru-
tiny analysis for pendent third-party and pendent personal jurisdiction, as required
by Aldinger and Kroger. To propose standards of statutory review for the different
levels of the pendent jurisdiction schema is beyond the scope of this Note, but clearly
the strict scrutiny of statutory intent has direct bearing on pendent personal jurisdic-
tion.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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this context, the implications and constitutionality of a strict adher-
ence to the Erie/Klaxon choice of law doctrine must be examined.
Courts granting pendent personal jurisdiction have maintained,
apart from the supposed statutory grant of jurisdiction, that pendent
personal jurisdiction is merely one aspect of basic pendent subject
matter jurisdiction and that due process considerations are satis-
fied.100 These courts conclude that additional justification emanates
from the considerations of "judicial economy, convenience and fair-
ness to litigants." 01 Courts and commentators have maintained that
pendent personal jurisdiction avoids duplicative litigation. 02 Consoli-
dation of the litigation 0 3 can only occur, in the absence of pendent
personal jurisdiction, if the plaintiff brings a second suit in a district
court in the defendant's home state. The state claim can be brought
under the diversity statute, and the federal case can then be transfer-
red to the court hearing the state claim. The non-federal claim,
however, could not be transferred to the district where the federal
claim was pending because 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) permits transfer only
to a district court where the claim might have been brought. 10 4 In
such a case, the state claim could not have been brought in the
plaintiffs original choice of district court because it had no personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.
100. The courts that have granted pendent personal jurisdiction rely in particular
on the due process analysis in Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d
Cir. 1973): "Once the defendant is before the court, it matters little, from the point
of view of procedural due process, that he has become subject to the court's ultimate
judgment as a result of territorial or extraterritorial process. Looked at from this
standpoint, the issue is not one of territorial in personam jurisdiction-that has
already been answered by the statutes-but of subject matter jurisdiction. It is
merely an aspect of the basic pendent jurisdiction problem." See Hargrave v. Oki
Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980); Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States
Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 575 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117, 1122
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
101. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see Oetiker v. Jurid
Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 484
F.2d 553, 555-56 (3d Cir. 1973); Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp.
714, 747 (M.D.N.C. 1980); Warren v. Bokum Resources Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1360,
1365 (D.N.M. 1977); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l, 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1172 (D.R.I.
1976); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp.
565, 576 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
102. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980); Schwartz
v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195, 198 n.6 (2d Cir. 1959); Ferguson, supra note 8, at 77-79.
103. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) provides in part: "When actions involving a common
question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order ... all the actions
consolidated."
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought."
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This approach is both cumbersome and judicially uneconomical.
The doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction is an economical proce-
dure to avoid this waste of judicial and monetary resources. In the
pendent personal jurisdiction cases, however, it is the plaintiff's insis-
tence upon a forum where the defendant is not personally amenable to
suit which necessitates in part the special doctrine of pendent personal
jurisdiction. When courts grant pendent personal jurisdiction, they
must then apply the law of the state in which it sits, presumably the
plaintiff's forum state. The defendant is then subjected to "whatever
the various peculiarities of distant state law might be." 105 The con-
siderations of judicial economy and convenience obliterate the
defendant's constitutional protection from exposure to state laws ab-
sent jurisdictional justification. The Supreme Court in Van Dusen v.
Barrack,106 held that the transferee court under a § 1404(a) transfer is
obligated to apply the state law that would have been applied by the
transferor court. 10 7 Under the guise of judicial economy, the Van
Dusen protection from exposure to laws of a state where the defendant
is not personally amenable to suit is overlooked in pendent personal
jurisdiction cases. Consequently, the grant of pendent personal juris-
diction and automatic application of the Erie/Klaxon doctrine denies
the constitutional protection available to nonresident defendants.
II. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BErWEEN CHOICE OF LAW AND PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
A. Personal Jurisdiction and Federalism
The trend of lower federal court authority indicates that the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction sustains the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over state-created claims when service on nonresident defendants
is supported only by special statutory provisions applicable to the
federal claim.108 As mandated by the Erie doctrine, when federal
courts adjudicate these pendent state claims, they must apply the
substantive law of the state in which it sits. 109 This includes applying
105. Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 706 (D. Mass.
1964); see Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801, 804-05 (D. Colo.
1964), af-f'd sub nom. Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir.
1965); ILGWU v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
106. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
107. Id. at 635-37.
108. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1980); Oetiker
v. Jurid Werke, GmbH, 556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Penn Cent.
Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir. 1973); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515,
529-30 (8th Cir. 1973). See supra note 9.
109. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev.
Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977); Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc.,
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the forum state's choice of law rules as prescribed by Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co."0 which, in effect, subjects the
nonresident defendant to the law of another state absent the mini-
mum contacts that the Supreme Court has equated with due process.
Although courts that grant pendent personal jurisdiction do not al-
ways announce their avoidance of minimum contacts analysis, some
courts have stated explicitly that state long-arm jurisdiction over the
defendant could not have been independently acquired."' In the
context of pendent personal jurisdiction, the issues of conformity with
due process, constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and the
emphasis on federalism need to be examined.
Throughout the evolution of personal jurisdiction theory, the Su-
preme Court has relied upon both the fairness and foreseeability
limitations of the due process clause" 2 and the policies of interstate
federalism to determine the boundaries for state court jurisdiction." 3
The modern law of personal jurisdiction has changed substantially
Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977); Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc.,
59 F.R.D. 99, 108 n.l1 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Briskin v. Glickman, 267 F. Supp. 600, 603
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Mintz v. Allen, 254 F. Supp. 1012, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Evolu-
tion and Scope, supra note 13, at 1043 n.142.
110. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
111. Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp.
981, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 746-47 (M.D.N.C.
1980). The necessity for pendent personal jurisdiction arises when the federal court
cannot otherwise obtain personal jurisdiction. Even when state long-arm statutes
confer personal jurisdiction, courts have found additional support from the doctrine
of pendent personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d
515, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1973); Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F,
Supp. 865, 868 (D. Conn. 1977); Bertozzi v. King Louie Int'l, 420 F. Supp. 1166,
1172 n.4 (D.R.I. 1976); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 568
(S.D. Iowa 1973).
112. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). An important consideration in
analyzing the foreseeability of the court's exercise of jurisdiction is whether "the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 444 U.S. at 297. Implicit in the
fairness requirement, however, "is the understanding that the burden on the defend-
ant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in
light of other relevant factors, including ... the interstate judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies . Id. at
292 (citations omitted).
113. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877), overruled,
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Redish, supra note 19, at 1114-15; Reese I,
supra note 16, at 1588-89; Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum
Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1341,
1343-49 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Federalism and Due Process].
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from the simplistic demands of Pennoyer v. Neff,11 4 that "[p]rocess
from .. .one State cannot run into another State."" 5 The strict
Pennoyer mandate, although reflecting policies of interstate federal-
ism, 11 6 no longer controls the rules governing personal jurisdiction." 7
The increased flow of commercial activity between the states ush-
ered in the modern era of personal jurisdiction," 8 and in its landmark
decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,"9 the Supreme
Court held that due process is satisfied when personal jurisdiction is
exercised over a nonresident defendant whose "minimum contacts"
with the forum state are such that "maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ",120
The Court required that the minimum contacts with the forum state
114. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In
Pennoyer, the petitioner brought an action to recover land in Oregon awarded to
respondent to satisfy an in personam judgment. The petitioner maintained that the
judgment was invalid because the state of Oregon neither served him with legal
process nor attached the land in question. The property had not been conveyed to the
petitioner and he was not in Oregon to receive a summons until after the judgment
had been rendered. The respondent argued that notice of summons was made by
proper publication; upon the petitioner's failure to appear, judgment was entered by
default. Id. at 719-20.
115. Id. at 727.
116. Id. The Court set forth two jurisdictional principles: first, "that every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty ... within its territory," id. at 722,
and second, "that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons
or property without its territory. The several States are of equal dignity and author-
ity, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others." Id.
(citations omitted); see Kamp, The Shrinking Forum: The Supreme Court's Limita-
tion of Jurisdiction-An Argument for a Federal Forum in Multi-Party, Multi-State
Litigation, 21 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 161, 162-63 (1979).
117. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1980);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202, 212 n.39 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 250-51 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23
(1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
118. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process; The Development of Quasi In
Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 Duke L.J. 1147, 1162-63; Kurland, supra
note 19, at 573.
119. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe was a Delaware corporation that
employed salesmen who resided and worked in Washington. Although International
Shoe rented display rooms in the state for use by the salesmen, it maintained no
offices, kept no merchandise and made no contracts in Washington. The salesmen's
authority was restricted to solicitation of orders that were subject to the approval of
the home office. The State of Washington sought to collect employer's contribution
for unemployment compensation from International Shoe. When the company
refused to pay, the State served process on one of the salesmen. The Supreme Court
of Washington upheld jurisdiction, reasoning that appellant's business in the state
was sufficient to constitute "doing business." The United States Supreme Court
rejected the "doing business" test but affirmed based upon a new "minimum con-
tacts" test. Id. at 316.
120. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The Court
based its holding exclusively on the due process clause. 326 U.S. at 315-17.
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conform to the principles of interstate federalism by being "reason-
able, in the context of our federal system of government." 121 In the
wake of International Shoe, many cases discussed the nature of con-
tacts demanded by the due process clause. In McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co., 22 the Court appeared to signal approval of an
expansive approach to the permissible scope of state court jurisdiction
over nonresidents because of the "increasing nationalization of com-
merce."'12 3 One year later, however, in Hanson v. Denckla,12 4 the
Court narrowed the expansiveness of McGee by holding that, in addi-
tion to minimum contacts, there must be some "affiliating circum-
stances" 125 of which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. 126  In an
attempt to delimit the broad application of International Shoe, Chief
121. 326 U.S. at 317.
122. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
123. Id. at 223. McGee involved an insurance claim by a California resident
against a Texas insurance company. State court jurisdiction was sustained on the
basis of a single, isolated contact by defendant with the forum state, the act of
sending a reinsurance certificate to plaintiff offering him insurance on the same terms
as had defendant's predecessor insurance company. Plaintiff accepted the offer and
mailed premium payments from his home in California to the defendant's office in
Texas. Defendant had no other contacts with the forum state. The Supreme Court, in
holding that the "Due Process Clause did not preclude the California court from
entering a judgment binding on respondent," reasoned that "California has a mani-
fest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims." Id. Thus, whenever the forum state's interest is
manifested by special regulation of the activity in question, the Court has found the
requisite quantum of contacts to be satisfied on the basis of only slight and attenuated
contacts with the forum state. In the absence of a special state interest, however, the
Court has progressively insisted on something more than merely attenuated contacts.
This position was first advanced in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252-54 (1958),
and reaffirmed in recent decisions. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1980); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92
(1978).
124. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, a Pennsylvania resident established an inter
vivos trust with a Delaware trustee. The resident then moved to Florida and, while
domiciled there, made gifts from the trust to her grandchildren under a power of
appointment. When she died, her will was probated in Florida. Her two daughters,
also Florida residents, and residuary legatees under the will, questioned the validity
of the trust. In an action for a declaratory judgment to determine their interest in the
estate, the Delaware trustee, an indispensable party under Florida law, was served
with notice of the Florida action. The trustee did not appear, and the Florida court
found for the two daughters. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the Delaware
trustee's contacts with Florida, consisting only of the remittance of trust income to
Florida, were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over that nonresident
defendant. The Court emphasized that the flexible standard of International Shoe
did not "[herald] the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts." Id. at 251.
125. Id. at 246 (quoting E. Sunderland, The Problem of Jurisdiction, Selected
Essays on Constitutional Law 1270, 1272 (1954)).
126. 357 U.S. at 253.
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Justice Warren emphasized the Court's reliance on policies of inter-
state federalism to explain that due process restrictions on personal
jurisdiction
are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or
distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations
on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden
of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called
upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that
State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
127
In two recent decisions, Shaffer v. Heitner,12s and Kulko v. Califor-
nia Superior Court,12 9 the Supreme Court has made clear that the due
process clause operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state
courts to "enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident
defendants."' 130  In the absence of sufficient "affiliating circum-
stances," determined by their nature and quality, due process is vio-
lated by the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants. 131
127. Id. at 251.
128. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In Shaf-fer, the plaintiff filed a stockholder's derivative
suit against officers of a Delaware corporation, alleging the defendants had violated
their duties to the corporation, resulting in civil and criminal liabilities. Simultane-
ously, the plaintiff attached shares of common stock in the corporation belonging to a
majority of the defendants. A special appearance by the defendants was rejected by
the Supreme Court of Delaware, which held that sequestration of stock to compel in
personam jurisdiction, with the failure to appear resulting in default, did not deny
due process of law and was not controlled by International Shoe. The United States
Supreme Court reversed and dramatically altered principles of in rem jurisdiction by
requiring that it satisfy the standards of International Shoe. Id. at 189-206, 217.
129. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). In Kulko, a New York resident challenged the personal
jurisdiction of a California court over him with respect to increased child support
obligations. The appellant's former wife, at the time a California resident, brought
an action in California court to establish a Haitian divorce decree and obtain an
increase in child support payments. The California Supreme Court upheld jurisdic-
tion based on the appellant's "purposeful act" of consenting to send his daughter to
California to live with her mother for the school year. Id. at 94. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, stating that appellant's contacts with
California "simply do not make California a 'fair forum' . . . in which to require
appellant ... to defend a child-support suit or to suffer liability by default." Id. at
100-01 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 91 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 198-200 (1977)).
131. "[A]n essential criterion in all cases is whether the 'quality and nature' of the
defendant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable' and 'fair' to require him to conduct
his defense in that State." 436 U.S. at 92 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17, 319 (1945)); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-12
(1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958).
The Court in Kulko recognized that the minimum contacts test is not susceptible to
mechanical application: "[Tihis determination is one in which few answers will be
written 'in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the
shades are innumerable."' 436 U.S. at 92 (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545(1948)).
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In the 1980 decision of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 32 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the emphasis of
"principles of interstate federalism" in the Court's due process analysis
of state judicial jurisdiction. 133 The Court maintained that
[W]e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrele-
vant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful
to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitu-
tion .... The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limita-
tion on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation express
or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment. 134
The Court stated that fairness and foreseeability limitations of due
process, while still of primary concern, 35 had been substantially re-
laxed as a result of the increased mobility of private citizens and the
economic interdependence of the states.136 Justice White, writing for
the Court, then acknowledged the impact of federalism concerns in
determining the constitutionality of state court jurisdiction:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
132. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide, two New York residents purchased a
new automobile from a New York retail dealer. The following year, while driving
through Oklahoma on the way to a new home in Arizona, the plaintiffs were
involved in an accident with another vehicle, which produced a fire that seriously
injured the plaintiffs. A products liability action was brought in Oklahoma state
court against the automobile's foreign manufacturer, its importer, its regional dis-
tributor and the local dealer. Id. at 288. The dealer and the regional distributor
entered special appearances to contest the constitutionality of jurisdiction on due
process grounds, but their claims were rejected by the trial court and the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction offended the minimum contacts test when based "on
one, isolated occurence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortui-
tous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York
residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma." Id. at
295.
The case of Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), was decided together with
World-Wide. In Rush, the plaintiff, an Indiana resident and a passenger in an
automobile driven by the defendant, also an Indiana resident, was injured in a
single-car accident in Indiana. Plaintiff later moved to Minnesota and brought an
action alleging negligence. The plaintiff attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction
over the defendant by garnishing his insurance company's obligation to defend and
indemnify the defendant. The insurance company, State Farm Insurance Company,
did business in Minnesota. Id. at 322. The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision to
exercise jurisdiction was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, which stated
that "the fictitious presence of the insurer's obligation in Minnesota does not, without
more, provide a basis for concluding that there is any contact in the International
Shoe sense between Minnesota and the insured." Id. at 329-30 (emphasis in original).
133. 444 U.S. at 293-94.
134. Id. at 293.
135. Id. at 292.
136. Id. at 292-93.
153
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even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to
the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instru-
ment of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State
of its power to render a valid judgment.' 37
The substantial emphasis in World-Wide on the relevance of inter-
state federalism prompted many commentators to suggest that consid-
erations of federalism were misplaced in a due process analysis of
personal jurisdiction. 38 In its most recent inquiry into due process
and personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,139 appears to have
substantially altered its position on the import of federalism. Justice
White, the author of World-Wide, in writing for the Court in Baux-
ites de Guinee, 40 maintained that the due process clause "represents a
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty" 141 and is "the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement and the clause itself makes no mention of
federalism concerns."'142
Commentators' negative reactions to World-Wide's use of federal-
ism and the supporting language in Bauxites de Guinee about remov-
ing the 105-year emphasis 143 on federalism in personal jurisdiction
analysis portend a new application of the policies of federalism. Amer-
ican federalism is rooted in two principles: the separate and indepen-
dent federal-state co-existence and the federal union of the separate
states, each a coequal sovereign. 44 The latter principle focuses on the
concern that citizens of individual states should not be subjected to the
137. Id. at 294 (emphasis added). The Court stated also that the minimum con-
tacts test "protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum [a]nd it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns
in a federal system." Id. at 292.
138. Jay, supra note 19, at 452-53; Posnak, supra note 19, at 789-90; Redish,
supra note 19, at 1114, 1143-44; Whitten, supra note 19, at 840; Federalism and Due
Process, supra note 113, at 1341-42.
139. 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
140. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist,
Stevens, and O'Connor joined in the opinion. Justice Powell filed an opinion concur-
ring in the judgment. 102 S. Ct. 2099, 2101, 2108 (1982).
141. Id. at 2104.
142. Id. at 2104 n.10 (emphasis added).
143. The original Supreme Court emphasis on interstate federalism in personal
jurisdiction cases was in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877), overruled,
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying
text.
144. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980); B.
Schwartz, Constitutional Law 45-46 (2d ed. 1979); Simson, State Autonomy in
Choice of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 61, 72-74 (1978).
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laws and policies of another state without sufficient justification. This
federalist concept protects citizens from being forced to change or
modify their behavior to comply with distant state laws. If the Su-
preme Court does remove federalism concerns from personal jurisdic-
tion determinations, an even more appropriate area in which to ad-
dress these vital concerns is choice of law analysis.
B. Choice of Law and Federalism
Not surprisingly, the policies underlying federalism are more appli-
cable to choice of law restrictions than to personal jurisdiction analy-
sis. The original federalism analysis, applied to personal jurisdiction
in Pennoyer, was not based on due process, but rather upon Justice
Story's commentaries 145 on conflicts of law and international sover-
eignty.146  While the due process clause is the "only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement," 147 the Supreme Court has struck
down a state court's choice of forum law on both due process 48 and
full faith and credit grounds. 149 The Constitution has also been inter-
145. J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (1834); see Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
146. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 9, § 1064, at 207-08; Hazard, supra note
19, at 262-65; Jay, supra note 19, at 452-53; Kurland, supra note 19, at 585; Redish,
supra note 19, at 1115-16; Whitten, supra note 19, at 840.
147. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct.
2099, 2104 & n.10 (1982).
148. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). In Home Insurance, the
plaintiff sued two New York insurance companies in Texas by garnishing their
obligations under contracts of reinsurance. The plaintiff was domiciled in Texas but
the insurance policy was issued in Mexico by a Mexican insurance company to a
Mexican citizen. The policy was assigned in Mexico to the plaintiff and covered a
vessel in Mexican waters. Although the policy requirement that any suit be brought
within a year after the loss was not met, the plaintiff brought suit in Texas based
upon a Texas statute prohibiting statute of limitations of periods less than two years.
The Texas court invalidated the insurance clause, but the Supreme Court reversed,
declaring that "nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts
of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas." Id. at 408. But see
Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964)(Court upheld Florida choice of law
jurisdiction when loss of property occurred in the state although the insurance policy
was issued in Illinois to an Illinois resident); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (Court upheld Louisiana choice of law jurisdiction when
injury occurred in Louisiana although the insurance policy was issued outside the
state to a nonresident corporation).
Commentary favoring the application of the due process clause for choice of law
restrictions include: Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 9 comment c (1971);
A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws § 9, at 33 (1962); R. Leflar, American Conflicts
Law § 55 (1977); Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith atnd Credit in
Choice of Law, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 94, 95-110 (1976); Reese I, supra note 16, at 1587-
89; Reese, Limitations on the Extraterritorial Application of Law, 4 Dalhousie L.J.
589, 590 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reese II].
149. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). In Yates, a
New York resident was issued a life insurance policy by a Massachusetts insurance
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preted to restrict choice of law decisions under the equal protection,'50
privileges and immunites,' 5 ' and commerce clauses. 5 2
Federalism concerns play a major role in shaping the constitutional
boundaries of choice of law. 153 The Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws recognizes that dominant concerns in choice of law analysis are
"the needs of the interstate and international systems."' 154  The Su-
company in New York. The New York resident materially misrepresented his
health-an unqualified defense in New York to a suit on the policy. The New York
resident died in New York and his spouse moved to Georgia and recovered judgment
against the insurance company under a flexible Georgia law concerning insurance
misrepresentations. The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that Georgia
had denied full faith and credit to New York law because there was "no occurrence,
nothing done, to which the law of Georgia could apply." Id. at 182; accord Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979) (inquiry into full faith and credit); Order of United
Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) (same); Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 549-50 (1935) (same).
Commentary favoring the application of the full faith and credit clause for choice
of law restrictions include: R. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System
of Government 43 (1955); Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State
Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 538-48 (1926);
Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs.
706, 714, 729-30 (1963); Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 151,
153 (1976); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 Cornell L. Rev.
185, 230 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Martin II]; Simson, supra note 147, at 66-69;
Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of
Law, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 449, 490-91 (1959).
150. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 2 comment b (1971); Currie &
Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection,
28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 passim (1960); Note, Unconstitutional Discrimination in Choice
of Law, 77 Colum L. Rev. 272, 295 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Unconstitutional
Discrimination].
151. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 2 comment b (1971); Currie &
Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and
Immunities, 69 Yale L.J. 1323 passim (1960); Unconstitutional Discrimination, supra
note 150, at 295.
152. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 2 comment b (1971); Horowitz,
The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. 806 passim (1971); see Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U.S.
312, 315-16 (1923); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914).
153. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273, 276 (1935);
Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642 (1935); D. Cavers, The Choice-of-Law
Process 64 (1965); Leflar, supra note 148, at 121; A. von Mehren & D. Trautman,
The Law of Multistate Problems 226-304 (1965); Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1963); Martin II, supra note 149, at 229;
Reese I, supra note 16, at 1608; Reese II, supra note 148, at 595, 605; von Mehren,
Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 Cornell L. Rev. 927, 938-39
(1975); Weinberg, supra note 16, at 441; Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private
International Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 297, 299 (1953); Note, Comparative Impair-
ment Reformed: Rethinking State Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
1079, 1083-84 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Impairment Reformed].
154. Restatement (Second) of Conflict Of Laws § 6(2)(a) (1971). The federalism
basis for choice of law considerations is the first criterion in the Restatement's listing
in choice of law principles. Id. at § 6(2)(a)-(g). These principles appear throughout
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preme Court has indicated an intention in Bauxites de Guinee 55 to
remove federalism analysis from the due process clause. 56 Unlike
personal jurisdiction requirements, which are limited solely by the
due process clause, 57 choice of law restrictions can accommodate
policies of federalism-policies deeply imbued in the nature of choice
of law doctrine. Martin Redish recently stated that "if the Supreme
Court is truly concerned with avoiding lateral friction within the
federal system, it should consider giving considerably closer scrutiny
to a state's choice of law than to its assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion." 158
In the recent decision of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,'59 the
entire Court viewed choice of law inquiry as covered by both the due
process and full faith and credit clauses. 1 0 Both Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion and Justice Powell's dissenting opinion, together
garnering seven out of the eight Justices deciding the case, maintained
that the standard of significant contacts between the forum state and
the litigation controlled the constitutional restrictions of both
clauses."6' The plurality and dissent, however, disagreed as to which
contacts were sufficient to support a state's interest, and made no
specific reference to the policies of interstate federalism. In Justice
Stevens' concurrence, the full faith and credit clause was described as
implementing a federalist design "by directing that a State, when
acting as the forum for litigation having multistate aspects or implica-
tions, respect the legitimate interests of other States and avoid in-
fringement upon their sovereignty."' 16 2  Justice Stevens maintained
the Restatement as the guiding factors of choice of law determinations involving the
problem of which state has the most significant relation to any litigated issue. The
original basis for the Restatement's order of principles was found in Cheatham &
Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum L. Rev. 959 (1952). Professor Reese
later became the reporter for the Second Restatement. See Leflar, The Nature of
Conflicts Law, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1080, 1082-83 & n.15 (1981).
155. 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982).
156. Id. at 2104 & n.10.
157. Id.
158. Redish, supra note 21, at 1114.
159. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). In Allstate, the plaintiff's husband was killed when the
motorcycle on which he was riding as a passenger was struck by an automobile. Both
drivers and the plaintiff were residents of Wisconsin, the situs of the accident. The
plaintiff subsequently moved to Minnesota and sued on her husband's automobile
insurance policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company covering the three cars he had
previously owned. Wisconsin law apparently limited recovery to $15,000, but Min-
nesota law permitted the coverage on all three cars to be "stacked," resulting in a
possible $45,000 recovery. Allstate Insurance Company argued that the Court should
apply Wisconsin law. The Minnesota Supreme Court sustained the trial court's
application of Minnesota law. The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a
plurality opinion. Id. at 305-06, 320 (plurality opinion).
160. Id. at 308 (plurality opinion); id. at 320-22 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
332, 334 (Powell, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 313, 320 (plurality opinion); id. at 332-36 (Powell, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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that choice of law analysis under the full faith and credit clause
protects interests of federalism and interstate comity.16 3 The analysis
in Allstate was described by one commentator as follows: "[W]e sud-
denly find the Court preparing some sort of change. Whatever its
position on conflicts may have been, the Court now seems to be
wavering in it. In [Allstate], a fragmented Supreme Court seems to be
searching for a new analysis that will somehow take in these addi-
tional concerns of fairness and federalism." 64 A shift of the federal-
ism inquiry from personal jurisdiction to choice of law analysis may
not entail a difficult transition, but it would substantially alter the
prevailing jurisprudence on the relative strengths of these two doc-
trines.
C. The Interrelationship Between Choice of Law and Personal
Jurisdiction Analysis
Courts and commentators have examined with close scrutiny the
eclipsing interrelationship between choice of law and personal juris-
diction. 65 The breadth of personal jurisdiction analysis, guided by
policies of federalism, has historically been considered as a stronger
test of constitutional protection and has thus encompassed choice of
law analysis. 66  This preemption stems from judicial interpretation
that once due process thresholds were fulfilled for personal jurisdic-
tion, then necessarily they were satisfied for choice of law consider-
ations. 67 The Supreme Court has reinforced this interpretation on
163. Id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Weinberg, supra note 16, at 44 &
n.22. Commentary discussing the federalism analysis in Allstate include: Brilmayer,
supra note 16, at 1315-16; Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in Supreme Court, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 960, 966 n.29 (1981); Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The Lessen-
ing of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C.D. L. Rev. 889, 896-97 (1981);
Comment, Legislative Jurisdiction, State Policies and Post-Occurrence Contacts in
Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1134, 1138-39, 1143
(1981).
164. Weinberg, supra note 16, at 443.
165. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13, 317 & n.23 (plurality
opinion) ("[t]he decision that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's laws and rules
should prove to be highly relevant to the fairness of permitting that same State to
accept jurisdiction for adjudicating the controversy.") (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 225 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part));
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Hay, supra note
15, at 170-72; Hill, supra note 163, at 987-93; McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction: From
a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1982); Reese I, supra note
15, at 1592.
166. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317 n.23 (1981) (plurality opinion);
id. at 336 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1980); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98
(1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253-54 (1958).
167. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
1982] PENDENT JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW 159
numerous occasions by stating, in dicta, that contacts sufficing for the
purpose of choice of law might not suffice for the purpose of personal
jurisdiction. I"
The Supreme Court's recent jurisdictional decisions 16 have denied
state courts the power to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-
resident defendants, and thus the Court has not had to consider fully
the constitutional implications of the choice of law problems that
would have arisen in those cases had personal jurisdiction been al-
lowed. Despite the admitted relation between choice of law and
personal jurisdiction, the Court has treated the two concepts sepa-
rately. It has set definitive boundaries on personal jurisdiction in
terms of the defendant's contacts with the forum in International
Shoe, Shaffer, Kulko and World-Wide. On the other hand, it has not
yet definitively expressed what specific principles may underlie choice
of law jurisdiction. 7 0  Perhaps the reason no clear standard has em-
erged is that choice of law problems implicate at least two separate
considerations: respect by one sovereign state for another sovereign's
laws (full faith and credit) and fairness to the litigants (due proc-
ess) .1 In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, although the Court did
not follow a dual constitutional analysis, Justice Stevens observed that
no clear analytical distinction between these two provisions had em-
erged and that no parameters had been set because the "Court's
analysis of choice-of-law questions and scholarly criticism of those
decisions have treated these two inquiries as though they were indis-
tinguishable." 72
It would be difficult indeed to set constitutional limits on choice of
law that would satisfy simultaneously a state's sovereignty interests in
its relations with other states and the fundamental fairness to be
accorded to individual litigants under the due process clause. 73 The
analyses for each clause have different outer limits: The full faith and
credit clause governs the extent to which states must interact with
168. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317 n.23 (1981) (plurality opinion);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1980); Kulko v.
California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
215-16 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1958).
169. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84
(1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
170. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 321 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) ("no clear analytical distinction"); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("constitutional limitations
on the choice of law are by no means settled"); Martin I, supra note 16, at 888
("confused theory"); Reese I, supra note 16, at 1587 ("relatively unexplored").
171. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
172. 449 U.S. at 321-22 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
173. See Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct.
2099, 2104 & n.10 (1982).
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each other in the interests of national unity, and the due process clause
limits such interaction in the interests of personal rights.1 74 While
analyses of whether either clause should be preferred, or whether a
dual constitutional standard should be utilized in ordinary choice of
law cases are beyond the scope of this Note, the Supreme Court's
apparent intention to remove federalism inquiries from the due proc-
ess clause may herald an increasing emphasis on the full faith and
credit clause for choice of law analysis.
The removal of federalism concerns from the due process clause,
and therefore, from personal jurisdiction analysis,175 still leaves the
policies of federalism safeguarded by choice of law analysis. This shift
of federalism away from personal jurisdiction demands a reversal of
the prevailing jurisprudence, which bypasses choice of law concerns
once personal jurisdiction thresholds have been satisfied.176  Even
before the transfer of federalism policy was described by the Court,
commentators had argued that choice of law concerns demanded at
least the same strict scrutiny as did personal jurisdiction thresh-
olds. 177  One commentator posited: "To believe that a defendant's
contacts with the forum state should be stronger under the due process
clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe
that an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged than
whether."' 178 This call for a reversal in judicial assumptions on per-
sonal jurisdiction and choice of law has been buttressed by recent
demands that courts specify the minimum contacts needed before a
state may apply its substantive law to a case.179
It thus appears that the cloak of personal jurisdiction may have
been lifted from choice of law analysis. In his concurrence in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,80
Justice Powell stated that "[b]y eschewing reliance on the concept of
minimum contacts as a 'sovereign' limitation on the power of
174. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 321-22 (1981) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
175. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct.
2099, 2104 & n.10 (1982).
176. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
177. Hill, supra note 163, at 989-93 ("Being forced to defend in the distant state
may be inconvenient and costly, but application of the substantive law of that state
could be fatal."); Martin I, supra note 16, at 879-880 ("[Prevailing jurisprudence
from defendant's perspective] turns things on their head."); Silberman, supra note
16, at 88 ("if a court has the power to apply its own law, it should have the power to
exercise jurisdiction over the action" (emphasis in original)); see Hay, supra note 16,
at 171-72; Lowenfeld & Silberman, Choice of Law and the Supreme Court: A
Dialogue Inspired by Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 14 U.C.D. L. Rev. 841, 845 (1981);
Reese I, supra note 16, at 1592.
178. Silberman, supra note 16, at 88.
179. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
180. 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982).
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States ... the Court today effects a potentially substantial change of
law." 18' The doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction removes the
cloak of personal jurisdiction without any need for support from the
apparent shift in federalism analysis. Courts applying the doctrine of
pendent personal jurisdiction justify the bypass of personal jurisdic-
tion requirements by referring to statutory authority and policies of
judicial economy. 18 2 These courts, however, do not then inquire into
the requirements for choice of law thresholds-questions covered by
the cloak of personal jurisdiction in pendent personal jurisdiction.
When courts rectify the oversight of choice of law analysis in this
context, the framework presented in this section may serve as a useful
aid in the resolution of this problem.
III. FEDERAL CHOICE OF LAW DETERMINATION FOR PENDENT
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
As demanded by the Erie/Klaxon doctrine, when pendent personal
jurisdiction is granted, a nonresident defendant is subjected to the
choice of law rules of the state in which the district courts sits. This is
so even though personal jurisdiction could not have been obtained in
that state's courts. 8 3 Federal courts, as neutral forums, should deter-
mine for themselves the substantive law to be applied to the state case.
There are several modern choice of law theories,18 4 all of which
have in common "a widely noted tendency to result in the application
of forum law-in other words, of plaintiffs law." 8 5 Commentators
have noted the forum bias inherent in contemporary choice of law
181. Id. at 2110 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). In Horne v.
Adolph Coors Co., No. 81-2388, slip op. at 7 (3d Cir. July 22, 1982), the court
described the Supreme Court's removal of federalism analysis from personal jurisdic-
tion as a "somewhat surprising observation" which may have announced "the aban-
donment of the rationale of [World-Wide and Hanson]." Id. at 8. The court posited
that "the federalism aspect of the International Shoe rule is a constitutionally pro-
tected expectation in a proper choice of the governing law." Id. at 8 n.2.
182. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
184. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971) (most significant rela-
tionship test); D. Cavers, supra note 153 (principles of preference); B. Currie,
Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963) (governmental interest analysis); A.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 148 (preference for forum laws); R. Leflar, supra note 148
(functional analysis); A. von Mehren & D. Trautman, supra note 153 (same); Baxter,
supra note 153 (comparative impairment test); see Westbrook, A Survey and Evalua-
tion of Competing Choice-of-Law-Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo.
L. Rev. 407 (1975); Comment, International Choice of Law: A Proposal for a New
"Enclave" of Federal Common Law, 5 Fordham Int'l L.J. 319, 325-33 (1982).
185. Weinberg, supra note 16, at 467 & n.140.
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doctrines,18 6 which in a pendent personal jurisdiction case manifests
itself in the application of a state's law against a non-resident defen-
dant with no justifiable connection to that state. 87 Even with the
normal personal jurisdictional restrictions on state courts, one com-
mentator concluded that "[tihe combination of far-reaching (extrater-
ritorial) jurisdiction of courts and of inward-looking approaches to
choice of law necessarily leads to forum shopping."""' In pendent
personal jurisdiction cases, even the "far-reaching" personal jurisdic-
tion requirements are ignored for reasons of economy and conven-
ience.
One possible solution to this problem would be to require that the
defendant have sufficient contacts with the state in which the district
court sits before jurisdiction can be granted for the state claim. Some
federal courts have gone so far as to require that even when federal
statutes authorize nationwide service of process, the defendant must
have minimum personal jurisdictional contacts with the state for the
federal claim. 8 9  A number of courts that have granted pendent
personal jurisdiction have followed this approach by requiring that
personal jurisdictional contacts be satisfied. 90 Although prevailing
authority merely requires personal jurisdictional contacts with the
United States as the sovereign, 19' a stricter test of contacts with the
186. Hay, supra note 16, at 182 ("modern approaches to choice of law frequently
are inward-looking, usually justified as a permissible, desirable, or highly practical
means for the furtherance of the forum state's interests and policies" (footnote
omitted)); Peterson, Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law,
14 U.C.D. L. Rev. 869, 871 (1981) ("modern choice theory strongly encourages the
application of forum law"); Comparative Impairment Reformed, supra note 153, at
1079-80 (the "new orthodoxy" of "interest analysis has come under sharp attack for
having an excessively narrow, and even unconstitutional, conception of a state's
interest in applying its laws"); see von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of
Justice, 41 Law & Contemp. Probs. 27, 30 (1977).
187. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
188. Hay, supra note 16, at 182.
189. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 &
n.2 (7th Cir. 1975); Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1968);
Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 154-55 (5th Cir.
1954); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 871-74 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 319 F. Supp. 1256, 1260-62 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Scott v. Middle E. Airlines Co., 240
F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
190. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 529-30 (8th Cir.
1973); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 567-68 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
In Donnely v. Copeland Intra Lenses, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), the court
required that a third-party defendant brought in under the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction must have minimum contacts with the forum state before the court can
assert jurisdiction. Id. at 83.
191. Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332-34 (7th Cir. 1979); Driver v.
Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156-57 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 8-10 (D.C.
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state will not solve the problem. When a federal statute provides
nationwide service of process, the grant of pendent personal jurisdic-
tion is only necessary if the federal court could not otherwise acquire
personal jurisdiction for purposes of the state claim.
One court in granting pendent personal jurisdiction concluded that
requiring minimum personal jurisdiction contacts with the state in
which the federal court sits was unduly restrictive of federal
power.19 2 Instead of merely requiring minimum contacts with the
United States, a procedure that inadequately protected the nonresi-
dent defendant, 193 the court required that a multi-level procedural
fairness balancing test be satisfied. 9 4  Although this intermediate
approach appears to be somewhat satisfactory, it has not been fol-
lowed by any other court.9 5
This Note proposes that when courts grant pendent personal juris-
diction, they are constrained to overlook the Erie/Klaxon doctrine and
develop federal choice of law rules. In Erie, the Supreme Court held
that in the absence of controlling federal provisions, if the jurisdiction
of a federal Court rests solely on diversity, it must apply the law of the
state in which it sits.' 96 Erie did not specify areas in which state
common law would take precedence over federal common law; only
subsequently in Klaxon did the Court hold that conflict of laws was
such an area.19 7 The Klaxon Court retained federal common law for
resolving conflicts of law arising from federal questions: "Subject only
to review by this Court on any federal question that may arise, [a
state] is free to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by
the law of the forum or some other law." 9 8
Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980);
Ninth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 493 F. Supp. 981,
982-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706,
709-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1038 (1982).
192. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 201 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
193. Id. at 201-02.
194. Id. at 203-04.
195. See Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 1980-1 Trade Cas.
63,261, at 78,299 (9th Cir. 19805; Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 334 (7th
Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1920); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569
F.2d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U.S. 527 (1980). A recent article examined the different approaches taken by
courts to determine the contacts necessary when a federal statute provides for nation-
wide service of process. The author proposed that a new fifth amendment methodol-
ogy be applied to these cases. Note, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on
Nationwide Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 403 (1981).
196. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
197. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
198. Id. at 496-97.
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The Klaxon decision has spurred a plethora of criticism, including
calls for federal choice of law determinations in diversity cases. 19 The
major criticism of Klaxon has been that federal control of choice of
law resolution is particularly appropriate in light of the strong federal-
ism policies that underlie the doctrine.20 1 One commentator asserted
that "[r]esponsibility for allocating spheres of legal control among
member states of a federal system cannot sensibly be placed elsewhere
than with the federal government." °2 0  Despite the strength of argu-
ments for federal control of choice of law rules in diversity cases, the
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Klaxon,20 2 and has shown no incli-
nation of overruling this doctrine.
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,2 0 3 the Court reaffirmed the
application of Erie, and necessarily that of Klaxon, in pendent juris-
diction cases.20 4 The Court did not make any reference, however, to
questions of pendent personal jurisdiction-a subtle and complex
question that can not be reconciled with an automatic application of
Erie/Klaxon. When a federal statute extends the reach of personal
jurisdiction beyond that of the state, it is inconsistent to then apply
state law. Commentators have vigorously criticized the application of
199. See, e.g., C. Wright, supra note 5, at 266 ("[federal courts] are in a uniquely
favorable position to develop a rational body of doctrine for that branch of the law");
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 515
(1954) ("[tlhe federal courts are in a peculiarly disinterested position to make a just
determination as to which state's laws ought to apply . . ."); Trautman, The Rela-
tion Between American Choice of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 105, 127 (1977) ("horizontal choice of law is an eminently appro-
priate area to be included within the scope of federal common law"); Traynor, Is
This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 657, 667 (1959) ("[fif the federal
courts develop an exemplary federal common law of conflicts, their rules are bound
to find their way into state law on similar problems and thus to diminish conflicts
further"); von Mehren, supra note 186, at 42 ("[p]erhaps the most satisfactory
solution would be to render choice of law unnecessary by establishing supra-national
rules ...").
200. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 581, 588
(1953) ("federal control is particularly appropriate in conflict of laws, which by its
nature involves interstate and international matters and not matters of merely local
concern"); Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1191, 1194 (1967) ("there should be, inherent in the federal
system, no autonomy for a state to resolve a problem of conflict of its law with that of
another state"); Traynor, supra note 199, at 675 ("in a federal system. . . recurringly
competing state interests in a conflicts case may have to be evaluated in the light of
the national interest in interstate harmony").
201. Baxter, supra note 153, at 23.
202. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam).
203. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
204. Id. at 726 (1966). See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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Klaxon in interpleader cases, 205 because interpleader provides for na-
tionwide service of process, and any stakeholder can bring suit in the
district where he resides and thereby force the federal court to apply
the law of his state. 20 6 One commentator maintained, in reference to
the interpleader problem, that "the power of nation-wide service of
process obligates the federal court to act as a neutral forum, not as the
vassal of the state in which it is sitting. 2 0 7
The criticisms applied to the interpleader/choice of law problem
are easily analogized to the pendent personal jurisdiction cases. The
American Law Institute (ALI) offered a compromise between Erie
policy and nationwide service by suggesting that in interpleader cases
the federal court should be allowed to determine the substantive state
law to be applied. 208  The ALI study also addressed the question of
pendent personal jurisdiction, described as "a matter on which the
case law is divided. '20 9 Both problems were resolved by the ALI with
the same solution of federal choice of law responsibility:
In [the pendent personal jurisdiction] situation the district court
should be free to make its own decision on choice of law. There is
no good reason why a state should be able to effectuate its desires in
this regard against an individual who could not be reached by state
process and appears in a forum within the state only by force of
federal power. 210
The protection afforded by requiring that federal courts act as
neutral forums would be significant. The predominant use of pendent
personal jurisdiction entails the appending of state blue sky laws and
common law to federal securities laws. 21 ' That the wide range of
state corporate and blue sky laws results in different substantive out-
comes in different states for the same set of facts has been well
documented. 21 2 The mechanical application of the Klaxon doctrine
205. See Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Territorial Reach Of
Federal Process, 8 Viii. L. Rev. 520, 528 & n.56 (1963); Freund, Federal-State
Relations in the Opinions of Judge Magruder, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1204, 1211 (1959);
Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 Ind. L.J. 228,
256 (1964).
206. See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503-04 (1941).
207. Weintraub, supra note 205, at 256.
208. ALI Study of Jurisdiction, supra note 11, § 2363(c), commentary at 420-21.
209. Id. § 1313(a), commentary at 211.
210. Id. at 211-12; see Currie I, supra note 11, at 283-84; see also E. Scoles & P.
Hay, supra note 11, at 125 ("[P]otential for increased interstate forum shopping [in
pendent personal jurisdiction cases] would be alleviated by freeing the federal courts
from the constraints of the Klaxon doctrine.").
211. See supra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text.
212. Cowett, Reorganizations, Consolidations, Mergers and Related Corporate
Events Under the Blue Sky Laws, 13 Bus. Law. 760, 766 (1958); Long, State
Securities Regulation-An Overview, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 541, 574-82 (1979); Loss, The
Conflict of Laws and the Blue Sky Laws, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 209, 209, 216, 253 (1957);
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in pendent personal jurisdiction cases causes a change in the applica-
ble law to the detriment of an interested state and to the disadvantage
of a defendant. If the defendant is brought into federal court with
nationwide service of process, the Van Dusen v. Barrack213 decision
signifies that under the proper procedural mechanisms, the defendant
should be treated as if the suit had been brought in a state in which he
could have been sued. This would include that state's choice of law
rules as required by § 1404(a) .214 Unfortunately, in contrast to the
Van Dusen analogy, it is not always clear where the suit would have
been brought had there been no nationwide service of process. There-
fore, for purposes of pendent personal jurisdiction, the only fair judi-
cial compromise between Erie policy and "considerations of judicial
economy"215 would be to force the federal courts to apply their own
choice of law rules. Should a court refuse to bypass Klaxon, it must
not be allowed to retain jurisdiction for the pendent state claim.
The application of different laws to the state claim under pendent
personal jurisdiction affects a defendant's substantive rights 216 and
violates the requirement of the Rules Enabling Act2 17 that those rules
promulgated thereunder not abridge the substantive rights of any
litigant.218  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were passed under
the authority conferred by the Rules Enabling Act 219 and therefore,
the process of rule 4 can not be allowed to affect substantive rights. In
view of these considerations, when a federal court grants pendent
personal jurisdiction, the Constitution compels it to overlook Klaxon
and make a neutral determination of the proper choice of law to be
applied to the pendent state claim.
CONCLUSION
Pendent personal jurisdiction allows federal courts to adjudicate
state-created rights by providing an alternative mechanism for obtain-
ing personal jurisdiction. This doctrine finds no statutory authoriza-
Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the
Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1118, 1123 (1958); see
Baraf, The Foreign Corporation-A Problem in Choice of Law Doctrine, 33 Brook-
lyn L. Rev. 219, 219 (1967); Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Choice of Law,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 466-67 (1950).
213. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
214. Id. at 639. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
215. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). The Court stated
that the justification for pendent jurisdiction "lies in considerations of judicial econ-
omy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Id.
216. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
217. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
218. Id.
219. 308 U.S. 645, 647, 649 (1938); F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 17
(2d ed. 1977); see C. Wright, supra note 5, § 62; 1B J. Moore, supra note 5,
0.501[1], [2].
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tion, but rather rests upon policies of judicial economy and conven-
ience. When courts grant pendent personal jurisdiction and then
follow the Klaxon directive, nonresident defendants are subjected to
the choice of law rules of a state that is unable to obtain personal
jurisdiction over them. The inherent forum bias of modern choice of
law theories, when combined with the disparities among state law,
results in varied adjudication due primarily to the location of the
federal forum. Federal courts allowing pendent personal jurisdiction
should, therefore, overlook Klaxon and develop federal choice of law
rules or forego consideration of the pendent state claim.
In Bauxites de Guinee, the Supreme Court has shown an intention
to remove federalism inquiries from personal jurisdiction analysis.
Federalism protections are a cornerstone of choice of law analysis and
Bauxites de Guinee should result in a reversal of the prevailing juris-
prudence, which asserts that choice of law standards are necessarily
met when personal jurisdiction requirements are satisfied. Pendent
personal jurisdiction removes the cloak of personal jurisdiction with-
out reference to a shift in federalism inquiry, and provides a fertile
framework for federal courts to evaluate choice of law contacts. The
forum bias of modern choice of law theories must be reconciled with
the rights of individual states, and the scrutiny of choice of law
contacts can ensure the continued vitality of the federalist principles
of state sovereignty.
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